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Chapter 13

    1. The uranium conversion, processing and enrichment plants in operation at Tricastin
      1. AREVA NC TU5 facility and W plant
      2. The EURODIF gaseous diffusion enrichment plant
      3. The Georges Besse II ultracentrifugation enrichment plant project
    2. Nuclear fuel fabrication plants in Romans-sur-Isère and Marcoule
      1. The FBFC and CERCA uranium-based fuel fabrication plants
      2. The MÉLOX uranium and plutonium-based fuel fabrication plant
    3. AREVA NC reprocessing plants at La Hague
      1. Presentation
      2. Plant modifications
    1. Older AREVA NC La Hague installations
      1. Recovery of legacy waste
      2. Final shutdown of the UP2 400 plants, the STE2 facility and the ELAN IIB unit
    2. COMURHEX uranium hexafluoride preparation plant
    1. Regulating the main steps in the life of nuclear facilities
    2. Monitoring the organisation of the licensees of the cycle nuclear installations
      other than nuclear power plants
    3. Ensuring the consistency of the cycle
    4. Promoting operating experience feedback from the fuel cycle BNIs other than the NPPs
      1. Dealing with incidents
      2. Taking account of organisational and human factors
      3. Controlling the fire risk in nuclear facilities
      4. Controlling the criticality risk in nuclear facilities other than nuclear power plants

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Cross-disciplinary aspects

In 2012, ASN will continue the work started in 2011, in particular to examine the license or major modification applications for the fuel cycle facilities, and to set the framework for these operations: application to modify the conditions of operation of the GBI plant with a view to its final shutdown, application to modify the conditions of operation of the La Hague installations (BNI 116 and 118). In addition, it will continue the analysis of the safety review files, particularly those concerning the La Hague facilities.

ASN also initiated in September 2010 the overall review of the safety and radiation protection management process within the AREVA Group. This file was presented to the Advisory groups of experts on 14 December 2011.

ASN notes that efforts must be made to implement the group's organisational and human factors policy in all the facilities, and to involve the outside contractors in this as a matter of course. ASN will demand tracking of the development of subcontracting data and closer monitoring of outside contractors. It will in particular demand improvements in the monitoring of project management, including when this is ensured by a subsidiary of the group.

National long-term management of all activities relating to safety and radiation protection comes out as an essential factor in safety management.

In addition, ASN considers that new more representative "safety" indicators must be developed and implemented within the AREVA group. Lastly, AREVA must present an assessment of the use of the new aids for processing events and experience feedback.

Continuing in line with the actions taken in 2011, ASN will be particularly attentive to the integration of experience feedback by the AREVA group licensees, and to the implementation of the internal authorisation systems.

Lastly, ASN will specifically monitor the implementation of the complementary safety measures required further to the CSAs, the submittal of the required complementary studies, and will examine them.

Tricastin site

Pollution prevention and progress with the projects concerning the site's effluent and waste treatment stations remain the major issues for this site in 2012. In the framework of the CSAs performed further to the Fukushima Daiichi accident, ASN will closely monitor the implementation of measures to reinforce the safety of the site facilities that handle large quantities of UF6 and hydrofluoric acid, particularly the reinforcing of the earthquake resistance of certain ICPEs and the integration of the chemical risk in the emergency plans of the Tricastin site licensees.

Romans-sur-Isère site

In 2012 on the Romans-sur-Isère site, ASN will closely monitor confirmation of the progress already achieved in terms of safety. It more particularly expects to see better control of containment in certain premises, and of the fire risk in the FBFC plant. It will be attentive to the actions taken following the safety reassessment of the facilities belonging to the company CERCA. It will also be attentive to ensure the implementation of the improvements planned under the CSAs.

MÉLOX plant

ASN will be vigilant as to the means adopted to accompany the changes in materials used with regard to requirements in terms of safety and radiation protection. In this context, management of dosimetry and the ability to prevent organisational and human factor risks and the criticality risk will remain regulation and inspection priorities.

The periodic safety review file for the MÉLOX plant was handed over to the ministers and ASN in late September 2011. Its examination will be a key step in the life of the facility. It will enable the conformity of the facility with the applicable regulations and its baseline safety standard to be verified, while at the same time setting a safety improvement programme for the next ten years in the light of the best available practices. This safety review will also consider the important question of the role of the computerised production management system, which today ensures both prevention of the criticality risk and nuclear material accounting management.

La Hague site

ASN considers that efforts must be continued in the La Hague plants, particularly in the integration of operating experience feedback and the notification of significant events. In the framework of the periodic safety reviews of the facilities, 2012 should see the implementation of the safety-related equipment identification procedure and the improvement of the general operating rules of these plants. Regarding the periodic safety reviews, ASN has asked IRSN to examine more particularly the conformity reviews of the UP3 plant and the effects of aging on the structures and equipment.

As regards the recovery of legacy waste, ASN will be attentive to ensure that turnarounds in industrial strategy do not significantly delay the recovery and disposal of the waste from Silo 130 or the sludge from STE2 and HAO. ASN already gave instructions, to this end, in 2010 for silo 130 and will oversee the programme more closely in 2012.

Lastly, ASN will closely monitor the implementation of the system of internal authorisations at the La Hague site.

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