ASN Report 2018

in this work. It notably observes that the large-scale work on the RHF research reactor has been satisfactorily finalised, notably with the construction of new and robust emergency management premises, reinforcement of the tightness of the reactor building in the event of extreme flooding and the installation or modification of back-up systems to prevent loss of coolant risks. The stress tests were continued for a second group (batch 2) of 22 facilities with lesser safety implications. These include the UPRA (CIS Bio), CEA research facilities (Atalante, Cabri, LECA and Orphée) and ITER. The emergency management resources in the CEA centres in Cadarache, Marcoule and Saclay were reviewed under the second batch stress tests. In 2015, ASN ordered the construction of new emergency management means, more particularly the construction or reinforcement of the “hardened safety core" emergency centres so that they could withstand extreme climatic conditions. It finds that these projects are behind schedule on all the CEA centres, for various reasons, and that the initial deadlines were not met. ASN points out that given the delays observed in the construction of the new emergency management buildings for the Saclay and Cadarache centres, the compensatory measures proposed by CEA must be rapidly operational. Finally, of the thirty other LUDD facilities with the lowest safety implications (batch 3), ASN in 2013 issued a binding requirement on the CEA facilities (Lefca, LECI, Poséidon, Magenta and STAR), the Ganil and the irradiators of the Ionisos and Steris groups, for a calendar for submission of the stress tests reports running until 2020. For these facilities, the stress tests will be examined as part of a periodic safety review, as is currently the case for the Gammaster irradiator and the irradiators of the Ionisos group. 3 —  The nuclear safety of research and miscellaneous industrial facilities For each facility, the 2018 results are detailed in the introduction to this report per region and accompanied by the corresponding ASN assessment. Some licensees of research or miscellaneous industrial facilities only operate from one to three facilities. CEA operates a large number of facilities of varying types and safety implications, such as research reactors and laboratories contributing to enhancing knowledge for the nuclear industry (NPPs, fuel cycle, waste management), along with storage facilities. CEA has finally shut down several facilities and is preparing for or already carrying out their decommissioning. It is building a new research reactor to take over the activities of several shut down experimental reactors. During the periodic safety reviews, it identified the need to carry out work in numerous facilities, to enable them to continue to function. ASN will be attentive to the correct performance of the works identified in the periodic safety reviews. It thus observes that CEA sometimes makes undertakings for each dossier, although it is not always able to ensure that the human or financial resources are actually available. This can subsequently lead to certain undertakings not being met. ASN thus observed delays in the availability of new emergency management buildings, designed to take account of the lessons learned from Fukushima, for the Saclay and Cadarache centres. The compensatory measures proposed by CEA will need to be rapidly operational. ASN remains vigilant with respect to compliance with CEA’s schedule of commitments, the completeness of the dossiers transmitted, the quality of the answers to requests and compliance with the requirements. The regulations stipulate that the licensee must in particular have the technical skills needed to perform its activities. To ensure this, CEA defines and implements an Integrated Management System (IMS) ensuring that the requirements concerning the protection of interests are systematically taken into account in any decision concerning its nuclear facilities. This IMS specifies the steps taken with regard to organisation and to resources, in particular those adopted to control the activities important for the protection of persons and the environment. ASN oversight of the working of the organisations set up by CEA aims to check the IMS implementation procedures. ASN also monitors CEA’s organisation for managing the resources needed for performance of these activities. It checks that the organisational and human aspects have been correctly taken into account at the various stages in the lifetime of a facility (design, modification, final shutdown and decommissioning, etc.). To do this, ASN carries out inspections in the nuclear facilities or, more occasionally, in the head office departments. It also periodically examines a review of the entire CEA management system. The next CEA review is scheduled for 2019. ASN’s overall assessment of the nuclear safety of the facilities operated by CEA is also presented in the introduction. Finally, the assessment of the decommissioning and waste management strategy is presented in chapters 13 and 14. ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2018  333 12 – NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND MISCELLANEOUS INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES 12