ASN Report 2017

407 ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2017 Chapter 14  - Nuclear research and miscellaneous industrial facilities until 2035. ASN more particularly considered it necessary to order the updating of certain parts of the creation authorisation application, such as the safety analysis report and the notice presenting the licensee’s technical and financial capacity. ASN also considers that these new deadlines will allow progress in the R&D work necessary for demonstrating the safety of ITER. In addition, ASN will be particularly vigilant with regard to compliance with the new undertakings made by the ITER Organization (lead-times and quality of files) necessary for clearing certain hold points set by ASN. FUNDAMENTALS The RHF “hardened safety core» back-up systems The “hardened safety core” designates a set of structures and equipment capable of performing vital safety functions in the event of extreme events more severe than those considered in the design of the facility. These structures and equipment must thus withstand these extreme events. Following the Fukushima Daiichi accident and the resulting stress tests, the ILL defined a “hardened safety core” consisting of active and passive equipment and structures, some of which already exist and some of which need to be created. The active “hardened safety core” defined by the ILL comprises: a system participating in reactivity control: ཛྷ ཛྷ causing Reactor Shutdown in the event of an Earthquake (ARS), by dropping the safety rods, in the event of failure of the electrical power supplies, or a lack of secondary water flow. systems participating in cooling management, comprising: ཛྷ ཛྷ an Ultimate Reflooding System (CRU) (1) which, in the event of primary system breaks, enables the reactor to be resupplied with water from the pool; ཛྷ ཛྷ a groundwater system (CEN) (2) enabling the pools and the reactor block to be supplied with water pumped from the groundwater or from recirculation; ཛྷ ཛྷ a spent fuel transfer incident emergency operation (PUC). systems participating in containment management, comprising: ཛྷ ཛྷ a Containment Isolation System (SIE); ཛྷ ཛྷ a “Seismic” Depressurisation System (CDS) (3) enabling the air to be filtered before discharge. emergency and emergency management means, comprising: ཛྷ ཛྷ a Bunkered Emergency Operations Control Centre (PCS3) (4), situated high enough with regard to extreme flooding. Technological diversity (example: different types of sensors) and the presence of channel redundancy (example: two channels for the CEN) are sought for the “hardened safety core” systems. The main work in progress or completed in recent years for implementation of the ILL’s “hardened safety core” concerns the following systems: (2), (3), (1) and (4). Monteynard dam Le Drac L’Isère Nord Dam about 50km away CEN shafts and pipelines CEN shafts and pipelines Back-up electricity generating sets PCS3: bunkered emergency centre CDS stack Reactor building Reactor block (fuel) Pool Le Drac Overhead walkway