ASN Report 2017

388 ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2017 Chapter 13  - Nuclear fuel cycle installations 2. Integration of experience feedback from the Fukushima Daiichi accident Priority was given to integrating the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident on all the fuel cycle facilities. The licensees supplied stress test reports in September 2011 for all facilities and sites, with the exception of BNI 63 in Romans-sur-Isère, for which the report was submitted in September 2012. In June 2012, ASN set additional requirements for the Areva group facilities assessed in 2011, in the light of the conclusions of the stress tests. These requirements more specifically stipulate the deployment of a “hardened safety core” of material and organisational provisions designed to prevent a severe accident or limit its spread, mitigate large- scale releases and enable the licensee to fulfil its emergency management duties. 3. Regulating the nuclear fuel cycle facilities ASN regulates the fuel cycle facilities, more specifically with regard to: ཛྷ ཛྷ the safety cases produced by the licensee during the various steps in the operation of the nuclear facilities; ཛྷ ཛྷ the organisation of the licensees through inspections conducted in the field; ཛྷ ཛྷ fuel cycle consistency; ཛྷ ཛྷ operating experience feedback within the fuel cycle BNIs. This part specifies how the steps taken by ASN apply to the fuel cycle facilities. 3.1 The main steps in the life of nuclear facilities When the facilities undergo a substantial modification or make the transition to decommissioning, ASN is responsible for reviewing these modifications and proposes the draft decrees in support of these changes to the Government. ASN also establishes binding requirements for these main steps. Finally, ASN also reviews the safety files specific to each BNI. The Areva Group has not yet carried out the first periodic safety reviews on all its facilities. The series of initial periodic safety reviews to be completed before the end of 2017 is a major challenge for the Areva facilities. Experience feedback from the examination of the periodic safety review file for the UP3-A plant on the La Hague site should enable Areva to improve its process for the future reviews. For future reviews, ASN will in particular ensure that lessons are learned from the safety review of UP3-A, completed in 2016, in particular with regard to identification of the EIP and the corresponding defined requirements, in accordance with the Order of 7th February 2012 setting the general rules for BNIs. 3.2 Particular regulatory actions conducted in consultation with the Defence Nuclear Safety Authority (ASND) The upcoming declassification of the Tricastin DBNI to a BNI will mean that ASN will take over responsibility for oversight of these facilities. Together with the ASND, ASN ensures that consistency is maintained in the application of the safety and radiation protection requirements for the facilities under their respective responsibility on the Tricastin site. Most of the facilities regulated by the ASND have in fact been shut down or are being decommissioned and no longer play a role in national defence. In this respect, they no longer need to be subject to secrecy measures and will thus be gradually declassified to BNI status in the coming years. The facilities which are currently reprocessing the effluents and wastes from the entire site are scheduled for decommissioning and their activities will be taken over by the Trident unit (integrated processing of Tricastin nuclear waste) in the Socatri facility (see chapter 14). Some of the uranium storage facilities will be dismantled and the others will be incorporated into FOCUS The commissioning of the first post-Fukushima emergency management buildings for the fuel cycle plants In 2017, the Tricastin licensees were authorised to implement the revision of the On-site Emergency Plan (PUI) incorporating the hardened safety core provisions dedicated to emergency management. This authorisation more particularly allowed the site’s Local Strategic Management Command Post (PCD-L) to be moved to the new emergency management building designed to be robust to the extreme hazards identified for the Tricastin site. This building more specifically contains a ventilation system with filtration enabling the personnel present to be protected against a toxic release from the site’s facilities or neighbouring facilities, or a radioactive release from the neighbouring NPP. The Tricastin site command post building.