ASN Report 2017

304 ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2017 Chapter 10  - Sources of ionising radiation and their industrial, veterinary and research applications it becomes applicable, some persons/entities responsible for nuclear activities will have to categorise their sources according to the security risks they present and draw up a list of persons who shall be authorised to have access to the most dangerous sources, to transport them, and to have access to information concerning their protection against malicious acts; ཛྷ ཛྷ by preparing a draft ministerial order aiming at setting technical and organisational requirements that persons/ entities responsible for nuclear activities will have to apply to protect their sources against malicious acts. This order, whose publication is planned for 2018, should enter into effect progressively. The prescriptions aim, on the basis of a graded approach to the security risks, to limit access to the sources to duly authorised persons, to place one or more physical protective barriers between the sources and persons not authorised access to them, and tomake intrusion detection devices mandatory or to ensure the tracking of these sources. Manufacturers and stakeholders have been invited to take part in some of this work in order to give their opinions and comments on the proposed principles. As indicated earlier, ASN, building on its knowledge of the sources and facilities, actively participated in the drafting of this regulation. In 2018, ASN will be consulted on the draft ministerial order concerning the security of sources. 5. The main incidents in 2017 The inspections conducted on radiation sources and a complete round-up of radiation protection events in the small-scale nuclear activities sector reported to ASN are presented in chapter 4 of this report. Industrial radiography Each year ASN is notified of several incidents involving industrial radiography activities. As in 2016 and unlike previous years, no incident was rated level 2 on the INES scale in 2017. Graph 8 illustrates the trends in the number of incidents notified in the last few years. Graph 9 indicates the main factors implicated in these incidents. Analysis of the events confirms that cordoning-off the work zone is one of the key steps in the preparation and management of gamma radiograpy worksites. Experience feedback also shows that properly verifying that the source is in the safe position is essential for avoiding unintended and potentially significant radiation exposure. To do this the operators have various complementary means which constitute the safety barriers (indicators on the device, measurement with a radiation meter, etc.). The most noteworthy incident in 2017 concerns the abnormal exposure of two operators who entered the cordoned-off work zone to replace films, not realising that the source had not been returned to the safe position. The operators’ passive dosimeters registered effective doses of 9 and 3 mSv, which for one of the operators represents receiving well over a quarter of the regulatory maximum annual individual dose (20 mSv) in a single operation. The analysis conducted by the licensee and ASN identified numerous deficiencies in the organisation of radiation protection, including in particular the absence of a lighted indicator signalling the actual emission of ionising radiation, the failure to wear an active dosimeter and the absence of an operator holding the Certificate of competence to operate industrial radiography devices. Number of events 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2017 2016 0 5 10 15 20 25 GRAPH 8: Trend in the number of industrial radiography events notified reported to ASN Outside BNIs In BNIs Cordoning off Loss of source control Miscellaneous Abnormal exposure of workers Damage to the projector 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 GRAPH 9: Main causes of industrial radiography events notified to ASN over the 2015-2017 period Number of events ■ Loss of source control: situation where the source cannot return normally to the safe position inside the projector. ■ Cordoning off: work zone insufficiently or incorrectly cordoned off; intrusion – whether intentional or not – inside the cordoned off work zone. ■ Damage to the projector: situation where the gamma ray projector is damaged (for example: fall of the projector). ■ Abnormal exposure of workers: situations in which the worker exposure is not consistent with the job analysis (for example: exposure of a radiographer when the source is not in the safe position).