ASN Report 2017

242 ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2017 Chapter 08  - Regional overview of nuclear safety and radiation protection NORMANDIE ཛྷ ཛྷ the rigour of the start-up tests documentation and informing ASN of the progress of these tests and the deviations encountered, ཛྷ ཛྷ environmental protection. In addition, the time taken to deal with deviations must be improved and allow all deviations to be corrected before the contingent commissioning of the reactor. Lastly, the future EPR reactor licensee must speed up its preparation in view of the current EDF schedule. The electromechanical assembly operations continued in 2017 and led EDF to report 2 significant events for safety concerning the assembly of the main secondary systems. As the first event concerning the detection of several deviations was caused more specifically by a lack of safety culture in the workers responsible for these activities, ASN checked the identification of the root causes and the implementation of appropriate corrective action before the activities resumed. The second event relative to the failure to take into account the specific requirements of the break preclusion process prior to the manufacture and assembly of the equipment is currently being examined by ASN. EDF must also step up its monitoring of deviations detected by outside contractors responsible for mechanical assembly operations and ensure that they are suitably dealt with before the start-up tests and, whatever the case, before the contingent commissioning of the reactor. In view of the reactor commissioning time frames announced by EDF and further to the deviations in the preservation and commissioning of new heat exchangers in 2016 and 2017, EDF must remain attentive to the preservation of the equipment already installed, taking into account the consequences of filling the systems with water for the hydrostatic pressure tests and the start-up tests. ASN continued its oversight of the start-up tests with, for example, performance of the first overall tests of the EPR reactor. ASN considers that the organisation put in place for the preparation and implementation of the start-up tests can be improved on the whole. EDF must more specifically increase the rigour with which the test procedures are recorded and ensure that the deviations encountered are suitably documented. EDF must also improve the quality of the information given to ASN on the performance of the start-up tests and the deviations detected during these tests. Lastly, the verifications by EDF’s independent safety organisation must be reinforced in this area and lead to effective improvement measures. ASN inspected EDF’s environmental protection organisation on the worksite and considers that it can be improved. EDF must more specifically improve its monitoring of outside contractors in this area. EDF must also ensure appropriate management of the groundwater intake structures and of the buried legacy waste found on the site. ASN has stepped up its oversight of the organisation put in place by the teams tasked with future operation of the Flamanville 3 reactor for the management of safety, production of the operating and maintenance documentation, control of hazards, occupational radiation protection, transport and preparation for partial commissioning of the reactor. The organisation put in place by EDF to prepare for operation can be improved and, in view of EDF’s current schedule, requires a considerable amount of work in a short time frame. ASN ensures the labour inspection missions on the Flamanville 3 worksite. In 2017, ASN checked that outside contractors working on the site complied with the provisions relative to labour law. Regular checks were made to verify compliance with the applicable safety rules. With regard to these aspects, ASN made sure that the contractors’ organisation for work in confined spaces was reinforced and drew EDF’s attention to the need to maintain extreme vigilance with regard to the risks of falls from height and the impact of the start-up tests which entail the powering on of systems or the pressurisation of equipment. Lastly, ASN conducted several inspections focusing on the regulatory provisions governing the transnational secondment of workers, exemptions from the Sunday rest rule and the design rules for work premises. Andra’s Manche repository ASN considers that the condition and the operation of the Manche Repository (CSM) facilities are satisfactory. Andra must nevertheless continue its efforts to reinforce the stability of the cover and to eliminate the residual infiltrations of rainwater into the repository via the edge of the membrane. The examination or the periodic safety review guidance file led ASN to make requests in late 2017 concerning subjects on which Andra is falling behind schedule (justification of the technical principles of implementation of the permanent cover, the means of preserving the CSM site memory) and themes representing challenges for the next periodic safety review, such as updating of the impact study. A new version of the on-site emergency plan was authorised by ASN in April 2017, and the examination of the request to modify the BNI perimeter of the facility continued in 2017 and should be completed in 2018. Andra must continue to assess the effectiveness of the draining trench put in place during 2016 behind drainage chamber No. 11 (CD11) in order to collect part of the stormwater upstream of the chamber, and must continue the investigations to characterise the infiltrations detected in 2016 in CD14. During 2017, Andra sent ASN two authorisation applications, one concerning the updating of the waste study, the other concerning the revision of the CSM general operating rules. These authorisation applications are intended more specifically to integrate the requirements of ASN resolution 2015-DC-0508 of 21st April 2015 relative to the waste management study and the assessment of the waste produced in the basic nuclear installations. Ganil (National Large Heavy Ion Accelerator) After observing in November 2016 the lateness in implementing several requirements of ASN resolution 2015-DC-0516 of 7th July 2015 relative to the monitoring of discharges and the environment, ASN gave the Ganil formal notice to comply by 30th September 2017 through ASN resolution 2017-DC 0586 of 21st March 2017. A follow-up inspection on 12th December 2017 confirmed that the necessary compliance work had been carried out.