ASN Report 2017

236 ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2017 Chapter 08  - Regional overview of nuclear safety and radiation protection to 31st December 2022 in order to continue its activities during the transition phase between the initially planned shutdown date and the date the decommissioning decree takes effect. When it examines the periodic safety review and the decommissioning file, ASN will decide whether BNI 72 can continue to operate in complete safety. ASN will also check that the decommissioning preparation operations, particularly those relative to the removal of radioactive and hazardous substances, are carried out under optimum conditions of safety and radiation protection and with adequate means. ASN is moreover extremely attentive to the change in the management of the liquid effluents from the BNIs in the current context of local padlocking of the BNI 35 front-end tank room and the continued removal of the effluents to Marcoule under satisfactory conditions. More generally, the CEA must maintain the presence of its personnel in the field for the monitoring of outside contractors. ASN notes compliance with the deadlines of ASN resolution 2015-DC-0508 of 21st April 2015 for transmission of the update to the Saclay site “waste” study and the chapters of the general operating rules specific to the waste from the BNIs as a whole. ASN nevertheless observes disparities between the BNIs in the application of the waste regulations. ASN will ensure that the good practices are disseminated to all the installations. The review of the stress tests performed by the CEA led ASN to require the implementation of an emergency management hardened safety core in 2016. CEA complied with the initial deadlines of this resolution and forwarded additional studies and justifications concerning its ability to activate its emergency organisation in extreme situations. ASN is currently examining these elements and will remain attentive to the availability, maintenance and upgrading of the specific means of communication and alert of the Saclay site and its facilities. The periodic safety review files for BNIs 18, 35, 49 and 72 were submitted to ASN at the end of 2017 as expected and are currently being examined. CEA’s Fontenay-aux-Roses Centre In the light of its inspections and the incidents reported in 2017, ASN considers that the standard of safety of the Fontenay-aux- Roses BNIs is improving. The in-depth diagnosis of the Social, Organisational and Human Factors (SOHF) carried out in 2016 is beginning to produce results. Waste management has improved and performance of the operational management operations is satisfactory. ASNnotes the satisfactory monitoring of deviations and the involvement of the personnel. ASN takes positive note of the removal of the high-level effluents by the CEA in 2017. The organisation and implementation of emergency situation management can nevertheless be improved. ASN will closely monitor the CEA’s commitments in terms of manpower and training in this respect. ASN also regrets that revising of the On-site Emergency Plan (PUI) has still not been completed and that the files currently being examined (decommissioning, clean-out, etc.) are falling successively behind schedule. Given the ongoing reorganisation of the centre and staff vacancies, ASN observes that it has not been possible to catch up the delays. Control of the fire risk remains a major issue. The CEA has carried out specific studies to assess the fire resistance of its facilities. These studies however, which are part of the substantiation documents to be provided to finalise the revision of the on-site emergency plan, were not conclusive and need to be supplemented. The CEA submitted the periodic safety review files to ASN in early November, within the required times. Lastly, in 2018 ASN will analyse the new version of the application files to extend the decommissioning authorisation of the Fontenay- aux-Roses nuclear facilities. The CIS bio international plant in Saclay Broadly speaking, ASN considers that the safety of the facility operated by CIS bio needs to be significantly improved. To this end, ASN observes the efforts made by CIS bio international to render the safety management of the facility more efficient by reinforcing and modifying its organisation and its operating processes. However, despite some visible improvements, ASN considers that the results are still not good enough. The increase in significant events, the causes of which almost always include organisational and human failures, reflects an unsatisfactory situation of operating safety. The recurrence of certain events indicates shortcomings in taking operating experience feedback into account. The deviations observed during inspections reveal persistent weaknesses in the monitoring of actions and commitments, in operating rigour and in the applicationof the baseline requirements. More specifically, wastemanagement and the in-servicemonitoring of pressure equipment must be significantly improved. With regard to the periodic safety review follow-ups which have fallen increasingly behind schedule in the last few years despite the efforts made since the end of 2016, CIS bio international is still having difficulty in managing and meeting within deadlines the 50 additional requirements set by an ASN resolution. The shortcomings concern equally well the time frames for performing the studies and actions as to their content. Consequently, ASN has asked the licensee to commit itself to deadlines for ensuring compliance and it will be able to apply enforcement measures. The many projects, studies and work in progress – for several years in some cases – to improve the safety of the facility, have not been completed. Generally speaking, the large-scale actions initiated by CIS bio international are not completed within reasonable time frames. The implementation of new regulatory provisions is not adequately prepared for, resulting in lateness in their application. Complementary studies concerning the consequences of accident situations are currently being appraised. The inconveniences the facility creates for the protected interests should be significantly reduced in the medium term. This significant change in activities, concerning the sealed sources and iodine inventory held in the ILE-DE-FRANCE