ASN Report 2017

158 ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2017 Chapter 05  - Radiological emergency and post-accident situations The management of accidents of malicious origin occurring outside BNIs are not covered by this Circular, but by the Government’s NRBC (Nuclear, Radiological, Biological and Chemical) plan. 1.1.4 ASN role in the examination and monitoring of emergency plans and the drafting of contingency plans Examination of emergency plans for nuclear facilities or activities ASN reviews the On-site Emergency Plans as part of the procedure to authorise the commissioning of BNIs or the possession and utilisation of high-level sealed sources (Article R.1333-33 of the Public Health Code), as well as the management plans for events linked to radioactive substances transports and their updates. Participation in drafting the contingency Plans Contingency Plans, such as the PPI, identify the general public protection measures to mitigate the health and environmental consequences of any accident. The Prefect decides whether or not to deploy these measures on the basis of the predicted dose that would be received by the population in the event of the accident. Pursuant to the Domestic Security Code, the Prefect is responsible for drafting and approving the PPI. ASN provides assistance by analysing the technical data to be provided by the licensees, in particular the nature and scope of the consequences of an accident, with the help of its technical support organisation, IRSN. The PPI currently makes it possible to plan the public authorities’ response in the first hours of the accident in order to protect the population living within the currently defined 10km radius around the affected reactor. On 3rd October 2016, the Ministry for the Interior published an instruction concerning the response to a major nuclear or radiological accident: Changes in national doctrine for the drafting or modification of PPIs around NPPs operated by EDF. In 2017, it published a guide intended for the offices of the Prefects in order to implement this instruction by updating the PPIs for the NPPs to take account of the changes, in particular the preparation for “immediate” evacuation within a 5km radius, the integration of consumption restrictions as of the emergency phase and the expansion of the PPI radius for NPPs to 20 km. The PPI comprises a “reflex” phase which includes an immediate licensee alert of the populations within a 2 km radius of the facility, requiring them to take shelter and await instructions. The additional measures to be taken beyond the zone covered by the PPI are specified, as applicable, through a joint approach which can be based on the ORSEC arrangements, taking account of the characteristics of the accident and the weather conditions. ASN also assists the Ministry of the Interior’s General Directorate for Civil Security and Emergency Management (DGSCGC) with a view to supplementing the PPIs concerning aspects relating to post-accident management (see point 1.5). 1.2 Controlling urban development around nuclear sites The aim of controlling urban development is to limit the consequences of an accident for the population and property. Since 1987, this type of approach has been implemented around non-nuclear industrial facilities and it has been reinforced since the AZF facility accident that occurred in Toulouse in 2001. Act 2006-686 of 13th June 2006 concerning transparency and security on nuclear matters (TSN Act, now codified in Books I and V of the Environment Code), enables the public authorities to control urban development around BNIs, by implementing institutional controls limiting or prohibiting new constructions in the vicinity of these facilities. Given the specific nature of nuclear or radiological emergency management and of the corresponding risks, the steps taken for BNIs could be harsher than for installations classified for protection of the environment and lead to more stringent measures. The actions to control urban development entail a division of responsibilities between the licensee, the mayors and the State: ཛྷ ཛྷ The licensee is responsible for its activities and the related risks. ཛྷ ཛྷ The mayor is responsible for producing the town planning documents and issuing building permits. ཛྷ ཛྷ The Prefect informs the mayors of the existing risks, verifies the legality of the steps taken by the local authorities and may impose institutional controls as necessary. ASN supplies technical data in order to characterise the risk, and offers the Prefect its assistance in the urban development control process. The current approach to controlling activities around nuclear facilities exclusively concerns those subject to a PPI and Ministry of the Interior guide for drafting PPIs around NPPs.