2   NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SITUATIONS

The Chernobyl accident on 26 April 1986, showed that a nuclear accident was possible, and that it was necessary to make adequate preparation for and be able to respond to it. The psychological, social and economic consequences of possible population displacement or a more general restriction on the consumption or sale of foodstuffs must be taken into account by the authorities. Furthermore, more realistic assessments of the potential releases are needed.

Since this accident, France has continued to perfect its nuclear emergency management system, reinforcing its response measures and its regulatory framework for preventing and mitigating the consequences of a nuclear accident:

With respect to the licensees:
– developing the notion of "Safety Culture", and attaching greater importance to human factors;
– taking account of experience feedback from significant events in order to improve the organisation, working methods and installations (see chapter 4 point 1.3.3);
– setting up on-site emergency response organisations: on-site emergency plans (PUI) required by a decree of 1990;
– more complete and realistic assessments of the radiological consequences of accidents (reassessment by the IRSN).

With respect to the authorities:
– limitation of the radiological consequences for the population in the event of a major release: the off-site emergency plans (PPI) were set up by a decree of 1988 and then improved in 2000 to include a reflex phase. Decree 2005-1158 of 13 September 2005 concerning the off-site emergency plans specifies exercise frequency, PPI updating and public consultation;
– definition of response levels (sheltering, evacuation, absorption of stable iodine): initial recommendations in 1993 and levels finally determined in 2003;
– organisation of the authorities: directives mentioned at the beginning of the chapter (action by the authorities in response to an event leading to a radiological emergency (public information, alert management, national emergency response organisation, both locally and centrally), organisation of radioactivity measurements);
– public information and communication actions;
– definition of a severity scale for classifying nuclear safety events on the basis of factual criteria which led to the INES scale, implemented in France in 1994 and extended in 2004 to take in radiation protection (see chapter 6);
– orders of 30 November 2001 concerning creation of an emergency alert system around a BNI with a PPI and of 4 November 2005 concerning information of the population in the event of a radiological emergency.

All these measures were taken in a context of exchanges with the international community, particularly within international organisations (IAEA, NEA). The International Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (1986), the International Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident (1986) and European regulations on the importation or contamination of foodstuffs (1987) are noteworthy examples.

If it is to be considered fully operational, the entire response system must be regularly tested. This is the purpose of the nuclear emergency exercises. These exercises, which are the subject of an annual circular, involve the licensee, the local and national authorities - particularly the prefectures - the ASN and the IRSN. They are a means of testing the emergency plans, the response organisation and procedures and help with training the participating staff. The main aims of the exercises are defined at the beginning of the exercise. They are primarily to ensure a correct assessment of the situation, to bring the installation on which the accident occurred to a safe state, to take appropriate measures to protect the population and to ensure satisfactory communication with the media and the populations concerned. At the same time, the exercises are a means of testing the arrangements for alerting the national and international organisations.

Efforts are today continuing into improving post-accident situation management. France takes part in the working groups of the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) concerning post-accident management and organises INEX international exercises, analysis of which should lead to a draft policy within the next two years.