The ASN is taking part in the 6th TACIS regulatory assistance programme for the Russian Federation (RF/RA/06) which should last until mid-2007. It in particular advises the Russian nuclear safety authority on how to revise nuclear regulations to bring them into conformity with the Federal law on the technical regulatory process. Finally, 2005 saw the end of the 3rd PHARE project for assistance to Hungary (HU/RA/03) in which the ASN had taken part with respect to radiological emergency situations. The ASN also contributed to a PHARE project in Bulgaria to reduce the number of radioactive sources for which there was a risk of a lack of regulatory supervision. Another area of cooperation with the Russian Federation is to help this country nuclear safety authority to construct the regulatory framework necessary to authorise the nuclear facilities that need to be built for elimination of the military plutonium declared as surplus to Russian defence needs. These actions are supplemented by other international technical assistance programmes in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the G7 to improve nuclear safety in the eastern European countries, and which are financed by contributions from donor States and the European Union. Other international technical assistance programmes The ASN is a participant in the expert groups reporting to the EBRD
(European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), responsible for
managing multilateral funds to finance the following actions: Finally, with regard to nuclear safety, the ASN advises the French delegation to the Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG) of the G8 (G7 + Russian Federation). It in particular took part in the meetings of this group in London in March and May 2005. c) ASN's position The ASN observes that significant progress has been achieved in the
three priority areas defined by the G7: The safety authorities of the States which joined the Union on 1 May 2004 have therefore reached a level which should dispense with the need for further assistance. However, in the states of the ex-USSR, this key objective will not be reached for some time, owing to the profound changes it implies: adaptation of the structures of the State itself, change in mentality to admit the independence of the nuclear safety authorities and thus underpin their credibility, reinforce their status and their means. |