Articles L. 542-1 to L. 542-14 of the Environment Code set the broad outlines for research into radioactive waste management:
- high-level long-lived radioactive waste must be managed in such a way as to protect nature, the environment and human health, taking into consideration the rights of future generations;
- work is being conducted into:
- separation and transmutation of the long-lived radioactive elements in this waste,
- reversible or irreversible disposal in deep geological formations, the feasibility of which would notably be assessed by the construction of underground laboratories,
- processes permitting the packaging and long-term surface storage of this waste;
- Before 30 December 2006, the government will submit a report to Parliament overviewing this research along with a draft law authorising as necessary creation of a long-lived high level radioactive waste repository, and setting the conditions for the constraints and restrictions relating to this repository.

Most of 2005 was devoted to preparation for this deadline.

Those involved in the research work, the CEA and ANDRA, prepared a set of dossiers summarising the fourteen years of research in their respective areas: areas 1 and 3 for the CEA, and area 2 for ANDRA. A preliminary version of these dossiers was submitted in June 2005 and the final version in December 2005.

The Parliamentary Office for the Assessment of Scientific and Technological Options (OPECST) organised a series of hearings at the beginning of 2005, to review the current state of research in the various areas. The 15 March 2005 report took a clear stance on key subjects.

The National Assessment Commission will in early 2006 submit a summary of the quality of the work done and the results obtained and will specify a number of recommendations for future areas of work.

Based in particular on a review of the above-mentioned dossiers, the ASN will be required to submit an opinion to the Government at the beginning of 2006, concerning the safety of the various management solutions for high-level, long-lived waste.

As foreseen by the OPECST, Parliament could therefore give its approval in principle for a geological disposal type solution, for which the authorisation process has yet to be defined.

The ASN would clearly have a major role to play in determining whether the repository project offered the vital safety guarantees, prior to its construction.

The debate organised from September 2005 to January 2006 by the National Public Debates Committee, convened by the ministers for Industry and the Environment, should be a means of obtaining the opinion of the public concerning the general topic of radioactive waste.

All these elements should therefore be in place by early 2006 so that Parliament can reach a decision on this subject in 2006, the deadline set by the law of 30 December 1991.

The lessons learned from reviewing the results of the research by the players concerned are presented in the following chapters.

Separation/transmutation processes are aimed at isolating and transforming long-lived radionuclides in nuclear waste into short-lived radionuclides and stable elements.

Separation covers a number of processes, the purpose of which is to recover separately certain long-lived transuranians or fission products. These radionuclides, after repackaging, will be incinerated (by fission) to give short-lived nuclides, or transmuted (by capture) into stable atoms. Ongoing studies in this area are complementary to those performed by the ANDRA on a deep repository design insofar as they could lead to a reduction in the potential harmfulness of the waste placed in the repository.

Laboratory results have been obtained with separation of actinides (americium, neptunium, curium) and long-lived fission products (iodine 129, technetium 99, caesium 135). With regard to transmutation, simulations of various reactor populations were conducted, for transmutation of minor actinides: PWR, fast neutron reactors, 4th generation reactors which will be capable of producing energy by incinerating their own waste and that of the previous generation of reactors. The transmutation strategy requires access to a large nuclear installed base for long periods. The industrial feasibility of these projects still however has to be explored, in particular in the field of transmutation, in which considerable research will still be needed.

The ASN ensures that the experimentations involved in this research programme, performed notably in the Phénix and Atalante installations, are carried out under satisfactory safety conditions. With regard to Phénix, after major reactor renovation work and a final review by the Advisory Committee for reactors at the end of 2002, the ASN informed the CEA in January 2003 that it had no objections to resumption of operation, which took place in July 2003. At a later stage in this research, the implications of possible industrialisation of the separation and transmutation processes will have to be reviewed. Given the scale of the research still to be carried out, it can be assumed that no industrial application of these processes could be possible before about 2040.

Article L. 542-3 of the Environment Code requires that the possibility of reversible and irreversible disposal of radioactive waste in deep geological formations must be reviewed, in particular by building underground laboratories.

To date, only a single site (Bure, Meuse) has been designated for location of an underground laboratory and authorised by a decree in 1999.

On the basis of this review, the ANDRA received approval of the shaft sinking conditions on 7 August 2000 from the Ministers for Industry and the Environment. In December 2005 the two laboratory shafts reached the target depth of 490 m. In the main shaft, at a depth of 445 m, a 40-metre long experimentation niche was built and equipped starting in September 2004. It has been operational since December 2004. Since this niche was built, 40 boreholes have been made to obtain information on the mechanical behaviour of the rock and the composition of the fluids in the clay, plus an experiment on the diffusion of tracers. Sensors were also installed to monitor disturbances during excavation of the main shaft down to 490 m. The auxiliary shaft reached its nominal depth of 490m in October 2004 and in December 2005, more than 200 m of drifts had been excavated. A multi-experiment drift was equipped in October 2005 and the results of the KEY experiment into the feasibility of sealing the drift are currently being analysed. Construction of the laboratory, with the two shafts being joined up, should end in late 2006. The drilling of 5 diverted boreholes in 2003-2004 confirmed the homogeneity of the host rock.

On 24 August 2004, ministerial approval was given for construction of the experimentation niche after review of the dossiers concerning the summary of mechanical and hydraulic disturbances caused by construction of the shafts and the construction and experimentation programmes concerning this niche. Ministerial approval for construction of the laboratory drifts followed by their actual construction took place on 2 February 2005 after review of the corresponding application forwarded by the ANDRA.

Through inspections at ANDRA head office and on the Bure site, the ASN is ensuring that all quality assurance steps are being taken to make sure that the experiments carried out during excavation of the shafts and in the experimental drifts provide the hoped for results and that the steps have been taken to limit hydraulic and mechanical disturbances in the shaft environment.

The preliminary versions of the 2005 Clay and Granite Dossiers were sent to the ASN in June 2005. In the second half of 2005, these dossiers were reviewed by the IRSN and the Clay dossier was reviewed by the Advisory Committee for waste.

At the same time, a peer review of the 2005 Clay dossier was organised by OECD/NEA at the request of the ministers for the Environment and for Industry.

As they currently stand, the results submitted by ANDRA concerning the feasibility of a repository on the Bure site, indicate that there is nothing to oppose the possible construction of a repository in the geological formation reviewed at Bure. Additional information will however be required as part of the new investigative phase after 2006.

With regard to revision of the regulatory texts, the ASN - in association with the IRSN and the ANDRA - set up a working group responsible for updating RFS III.2.f on deep geological disposal of radioactive waste. The aim is to update the specifications for deep geological disposal by 2006. This updating of Basic Safety Rule III.2.f should allow consideration of design advances obtained notably in the radiation protection field, the importance attached to the notion of reversibility, together with feedback from various modelling exercises carried out in France and abroad. This work benefits from the extensive exchanges between French and Belgian experts. Franco-Belgian collaboration in particular led to the production of a joint document on "Elements of the safety approach to deep geological storage of radioactive waste". This document was translated into English, sent out to eight European partners active in this field and debated at a seminar organised at the Paris head offices of the ASN on 5 November 2004 under the chairmanship of the ASN and the AFCN. The Franco-Belgian document was also presented to the Advisory Committee for waste on 9 November 2004 to clarify the context for updating of RFS III.2.f.

Future actions to harmonise geological disposal safety rules were discussed and a further meeting was held on 20 May 2005 in Brussels. During this meeting, the decision was taken to create a working group with responsibility for conducting a pilot study on the regulatory analysis of a safety case for a geological repository. The working group consists of representatives from 8 European safety agencies, a representative of EU-DG/TREN and a representative of the IAEA. Two meetings were held, the first in Brussels on 30 June 2005 and the second in Stockholm on 27 and 28 October 2005.