Within the framework of quality assurance monitoring of transport-related activities, the ASN continued its follow-up work on approved packages. Since 1999, every French owner of type B or fissile packages or packages transported by special arrangement has to update a record sheet for each package concerned, indicating the date of entry into service, modifications undergone, date of last maintenance operation, use to which it has been put, etc. In 2001, these record sheets were modernised: to facilitate their management, a common format was adopted for the form to be filled out and the data base. A copy of the record sheets was sent to each owner for updating. In 2002, the ASN asked all owners also to declare packages containing 0.1 kg or more of uranium hexafluoride, for which approval has been mandatory since 2001.

The collected package record sheets have provided the ASN with a clearer picture of the overall French package situation. The 2005 figures show that 17,312 packages were declared, 6,227 of which were used for transport. Packages can be broken down into 89 package models, instead of 85 in 2004. The most widely used packages are the 48Y cylinders designed to transport natural uranium hexafluoride (7,214 packages, of which 5,908 are the property of a single owner, Eurodif Production). Moreover, more than 80% of the type B package owners reported possession of gamma radiography equipment (GAM 80, GAM 120, GAM 400, GMA 2500 and GR 30-50). These devices are intended for the transport of sources in special forms for gamma radiographic non-destructive tests and were the subject of a priority inspection campaign in 2001, which was repeated in 2005 to assess change in this area of activity.

In coordination with the DSND, the ASN asked the licensees as in 2004 to present an annual summary of the radioactive materials transport activities by the basic nuclear installations. The purpose of this summary is to harmonise the information received by the ASN with that from the other nuclear safety authorities. It mainly comprises information concerning transport traffic (internally and on public roads and railways), deviations, events, incidents or accidents and dosimetry records linked to transport activities.

The ASN has implemented inspection provisions involving the Regional Directorates for Industry, Research and the Environment at local level, in similar fashion to the procedures already adopted for basic nuclear installations.

These organisational arrangements allow inspections to be carried out on the sites of designers, manufacturers, users, carriers, consignors and their subcontractors and enable package quality to be monitored between two authorisation extensions. In this connection, the 5th sub-directorate of the DGSNR (BCCN) has been entrusted with manufacturing supervision of type B packages since 1998.

Training sessions for transport inspectors were renewed in 2005. They will be periodically provided to maintain inspector qualification.

From both the regulatory and practical standpoints, it is important to ensure good cohesion with other supervisory authorities responsible, notably, for the inspection of transport vehicles, for labour inspection in the transport sector or for the protection of nuclear materials. These authorities may have to prohibit transport operations further to observation of regulatory non-conformities.

The BNI inspectors' role in monitoring radioactive material transports, was in 2005 based around three key topics:
- gamma radiography;
- gammadensimeters;
- packages not approved by an Authority.

Checks were therefore carried out in particular on the consignors and carriers. At a more general level, inspections also took place at the manufacturers and on the maintenance sites.

A total of 72 inspections was carried out in 2005 in the field of radioactive material transport.

Progress has been made in drafting the radiation protection programmes. The documentation is on the whole available in the nuclear industry but there is still place for improvement with respect to evaluating doses and optimising radiation protection. The inspections conducted outside the nuclear industry in particular show a fairly widespread lack of any radiation protection programmes in companies which had not previously been inspected on this point.

Airport surveillance was also maintained in 2005 with inspections carried out in the Paris airports. These inspections were devoted to checking the requirements applicable to companies working in the cargo area. Progress has been achieved by those companies that had previously been inspected, particularly with respect to the radiation protection programmes. A significant drop in handling incidents involving packages containing radioactive materials was observed in the airports. Surveillance of the Paris airports will be maintained in 2006.