The following incident is a good example of those which occur during actual transport.

Theft of a scooter containing a lead detector.

On 4 October 2005, the ASN was informed of the theft in Marseille (Estaque district) on 21 September 2005 of a portable lead paint detector equipped with a cobalt 57 radioactive source with an activity level of about 444 megabecquerels. This equipment was being transported on a scooter, which is a means of transport explicitly prohibited by the regulations for this type of device.

In normal conditions of transport and use, the assembly consisting of the device and the source presents no particular hazard for anyone in the immediate vicinity. However, this equipment is not exempted from the regulations concerning the transport of dangerous goods by road (ADR order) and as such, it should have been transported in a four-wheeled vehicle.

The loss of the package and the conditions of transport involving a two-wheeled vehicle, led the ASN to rate this event at level 1 on the INES scale.

Nuclear safety is not only directed towards preventing accidents, but also towards limiting their consequences. To this end, in conformity with the defence in depth principle, the necessary provisions must be made to bring even an improbable accident situation under control. These "ultimate" lines of defence comprise specific organisational structures and emergency plans, involving both the consignor and the authorities.

The details of emergency assistance in the event of an accident are defined in special emergency response plans for radioactive material transport accidents, in accordance with decree 88-622 of 6 May 1988, implementing law 87-565 of 22 July 1987. These actions are supervised by the Directorate for Civil Defence and Security at the Ministry for the Interior, which the ASN assists.

The ASN took part in the work of the interministerial committee entrusted with preparing a guidance circular to assist the Prefects in drafting the PSS-TMR (specialised emergency plan for the transport of radioactive materials).

Both operational and practical, the PSS-TMR is an emergency plan which should be drafted and updated by the prefects. Its aim is to protect the response personnel, the local residents and the environment against the consequences of a radioactive material transport accident.

In 2005, the emergency response provisions put in place by the ASN, the Val d'Oise prefecture and the other national organisations, in particular the DDSC, were tested during an emergency exercise in the Val d'Oise département . This exercise concerned an accident occurring during road transport of low specific activity effluent destined for incineration and originating from the Paluel nuclear power plant. The consignor was EDF and the carriage commission agent and carrier was COGEMA Logistics. A further exercise will be organised in 2006.

In 2005, the ASN continued to strengthen the radioactive material transport inspections that has been carrying out since 1997. It continued the inspections conducted of the radioactive material packaging designers, manufacturers, carriers and consignors; it once again tested its emergency response procedures to an accident involving the transport of radioactive materials.

The inspections carried out in 2005 show that progress has been made, in particular in drafting the radiation protection programmes that have been mandatory since 2001, but that there is still place for improvement. The ASN will be continuing its inspections in 2006.

Given the rise in the number of occasions the regulation contamination limits were exceeded during spent fuel transports, the ASN also asked EDF to take corrective steps to prevent such deviations happening again. EDF took immediate steps and initiated an in-depth analysis of the deviations, which could lead to additional measures. The results of these measures will be transmitted by the end of June 2006.

Finally, the ASN continued the technical background work prior to issue certificates approval: periodic safety reviews of existing package models and the approval of new models incorporating innovative design features contribute to the overall upgrading of transport safety. This work in particular led to a highly significant drop in the number of special arrangements delivered (about fifty in 2000, less than ten in 2005).

All these actions taken together have led to improvement in and reinforcement of the safety culture among the transport operators.